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Abstract: This paper addresses the “right to die” through the lens of Derrida’s The Beast 
and the Sovereign, Volume One. Specifically focusing on the case of Tony Nicklinson v. 
Ministry of Justice, 2012, the essay posits two things. First, Derrida’s insight helps us 
understand how a “fear of death” is a fundamental performative feature of sovereignty 
politics. Second, in order to maintain its performative role, sovereignty must perpetuate the 
belief that “man is wolf to man.” I argue that, in right-to-die cases, this has the effect of 
precluding compassionate reasons for taking the life of another. Thus, I posit that these two 
points, in part, explain how right-to-die cases fail on appeal. All is not lost, however, as 
this essay advances Derrida’s position that these performative workings of sovereignty, 
which currently preclude the right to die, are entirely deconstructable. As such, exploring 
how right-to-die cases are articulated in law permits a deconstruction of sovereignty 
politics and allows us to open up other ways of thinking about the relation between 
sovereignty, life, death, and our relationships with “others”. 
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1. Introduction 
On 16 August 2012, Judge Mr. Justice Charles ruled that plaintiff Tony Nicklinson’s appeal to end 
his life was denied [1]. Nicklinson’s harrowing story of a formerly active man who, after a stroke, was 
left severely paralyzed with locked-in syndrome, has attracted widespread attention in the United 
Kingdom. His case has once again called into question the right to assisted death, or voluntary active 
euthanasia, that was publicized several years earlier as the nation watched Dianne Pretty lose her battle 
against the courts in 2002 [2]. Scholars like Patrick Hanafin [3] have recognized an important 
“biopolitical” moment in the operational logic of these right-to-die cases. According to Hanafin,  
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right-to-die cases such as Nicklinson’s provide an interesting tension between an individual’s desire to 
die and the role of the state to “protect” life. If we accept Foucault’s [4,5] claims that governance 
appears to function by cultivating life—i.e., that the state is invested in managing and securing the 
functioning “life” of its population—then cases where individuals desire death allegedly disrupt such a 
life-advancing logic. While this is extremely insightful, I appropriate some of Derrida’s thoughts on 
sovereignty presented in The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1 [6] in order to further open up our 
analytic understanding of right-to-die cases. Specifically, I draw on Derrida’s treatment of biopolitics 
as that which operates according to a particular logic of sovereignty of the “performative” type. This 
sovereignty perpetuates a “fear of the other” in order to bring sovereignty into being as that which 
performs the role of “protector” of life. Moreover, this sovereign authority sustains itself as a 
“necessity” by continuing to perpetuate the notion that humanity is, by nature, “wolf-like.” This essay 
considers how sovereignty, which is sustained by the notion that we require protection from one 
another for fear of threat, is challenged in cases where an individual desires their own death at the 
hands of a “wolf.” Moreover, it allows us to form some understanding of why right-to-die cases seem 
to fail on appeal, and why the act of taking a life, even if this is desired and thereby deemed 
“voluntary,” has, for decades, been treated as “murder”—the most serious form of homicide.  
2. On Fear and Sovereignty 
Near the end of The Beast and The Sovereign, Derrida takes to task the Foucauldian distinction 
between sovereignty and biopolitics. He claims that “There are incredible novelties in bio-power but 
bio-power or zoo-power are not new” ([6], p. 330). For Derrida, all political arrangements of power 
inclusive of biopolitics operate according to a logic of sovereignty, which renders itself “absolute” 
through performances of what he calls “indivisibility.” At the heart of these performances is a 
necessary deferral to fear. As Derrida writes,  
as there is no law without sovereignty, we shall have to say that sovereignty calls for, presupposes, provokes 
fear, as its condition of possibility but also its main effect. Sovereignty causes fear, and fear makes the 
sovereign ([6], p. 40). 
Derrida’s reflections on fear refer to it in the Hobbesian sense, as that which is integral to 
“sovereignty” politics, but also in the Foucauldian sense, relating it to a focus on “biopolitical life.” As 
he writes, “Fear is primarily fear for...one’s own body proper, i.e. for life. Life lives in fear” ([6], p. 41).  
According to Derrida, fear for one’s life is what authorizes sovereignty as a mode of governance 
that is meant to protect life. However, according to Derrida, we move “from one fear to another” ([6], 
pp. 42–43). When we come together as a people under sovereignty, Derrida suggests that we shift from 
fearing death in a state of nature, to fearing death at the hands of the sovereign. While the sovereign 
order and its law is there to protect us, we become fearful of legal transgression. Thus, as Derrida 
expresses, “being the subject of one’s fear and being the subject of the law or the state, being obliged 
to obey the state as one obeys one’s fear, are at bottom the same thing” ([6], p. 43). The transfer to a 
fear of the sovereign, however, does not distil the fear that we feel toward others. Not only does 
sovereignty instill fear in us if we threaten to transgress its laws, but it appears that sovereignty also 
perpetuates the fear of the other that we otherwise felt in the state of nature. It does so in order to 
continue to present itself as a necessary mode of protection, and to secure obedience. In this regard, 
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Derrida explains how, to show that it is necessary, sovereignty propagates an image of man as “wolf” 
to man, such that sovereignty is a guarantor of life by “keeping the wolves at bay.” This relies, posits 
Derrida, on what Schmitt calls the “anthropological basis for political theory”—“a pessimistic 
anthropology, which has a vision of man as bad, corrupt, dangerous, fearful and violent” ([6], p. 44).  
Presenting sovereignty in such a way as indivisible, grounded in fear, can be said to have a two-fold 
effect that both totalizes and individualizes humanity. First, it totalizes “the people” into a single body 
through a social contract, whereby the people collectively transfer power to a sovereign whom they 
obey out of the desire for protection. Second, it individualizes “the people” who, despite being a 
“unified” body, desire individual protection from one another. Thus, sovereignty brings us together, 
but also operates through the continued separation of the people in order to sustain its necessary role of 
“protector.” This simultaneous totalization and individualization is akin to Roberto Esposito’s [7,8] 
reflections on the “immunity paradigm.” In this paradigm, the social contract like that which Hobbes’s 
sovereign enunciates, grants us a “liberal” type of freedom that frees us from others; thus, liberalism 
separates us from others, or “immunizes us” from one another. Through liberal concepts like 
personhood, property, and rights, we are secured from one another, which allow us to live, in Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s words, “side by side unconnected by a common tie” ([7], p. 76). In this account, 
sovereignty is generated by a common will for self-preservation. This will is grounded in a fear of 
death at the hands of the other. Sovereignty must appear to allay this fear of death, while at the same 
time perpetuate it, in order to preserve itself as a necessary arbitrator of freedom.  
In short, law, as that which is “endowed” with sovereignty’s “content” ([9], p. 147), is rationalized 
as a mode of protection from one another. Sovereignty is alleged to step in and save us from each other 
and our selves, giving us a life “free” from fear. This is all a ruse, however, according to Derrida. We 
are not “wolf” to one another, but, rather, sovereignty—and as its extension, law—must perpetuate this 
“pessimistic anthropology” to secure its authority. It is therefore a “prosthetic” sovereign, because it is 
“artificial” ([6], p. 28). It is a “performance” of sovereignty, which presents the sovereign as an all-
powerful image of the people—a “unified” body, the Leviathan ([6], p. 28). The construction of the 
fear of the other as “proper” to man generates this image of an all-powerful sovereign. It is framed in a 
similar way to how Foucault describes power relations, as a “theatre where presentations are 
exchanged,” that preserves the sovereign’s necessity ([10], p. 92). Fear, therefore, according to 
Derrida, underscores the inception of the sovereign—and biopolitical—order and, furthermore, 
sustains that order: “we shall have to say that sovereignty calls for, presupposes, provokes fear, as its 
condition of possibility but also as its main effect. Sovereignty causes fear, and fear makes the 
sovereign” ([6], p.40). This leads to two questions in this essay. First, how does sovereignty “call for,” 
“presuppose,” “provoke,” and “cause” fear in right-to-die cases? Second, how does sovereignty 
“perform indivisibility”—i.e., how does sovereignty present itself as “absolute” and necessary? 
3. Man as Wolf to Man 
Tony Nicklinson was certain that he wanted to end his life, so much so that he noted prior to the 
hearing of his case in 2012 that “I have wanted my life to end since 2007 so it is not a passing whim... 
A decision going against me condemns me to a life of increasing misery” ([1], paragraph 14). His 
narrative has been well broadcast across the UK media. Nicklinson is depicted as a formerly active 
man—a rugby player and avid skydiver. Following a business trip where he suffered from a 
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devastating stroke, Nicklinson was left paralyzed below the neck and unable to speak. Able to move 
his head and eyes only, Nicklinson’s form of communication had since been through a computer that 
he controlled through eye blinking. A statement recorded in the judgment on his case shares 
Nicklinson’s thoughts: 
My life can be summed up as dull, miserable, demeaning, undignified and intolerable...it is misery created by 
the accumulation of lots of things which are minor in themselves but, taken together, ruin what’s left of my 
life. Things like...constant dribbling; having to be hoisted everywhere; loss of independence, ...particularly 
toileting and washing, in fact all bodily functions (by far the hardest thing to get used to); having to forgo 
favourite foods; …having to wait until 10:30 to go to the toilet...in extreme circumstances I have gone in the 
chair, and have sat there until the carers arrived at the normal time ([1], paragraph 13). 
Despite Nicklinson’s appeals to be allowed to end his life through voluntary active euthanasia—which 
would mean that someone else such as his wife, Jane, or a physician, could end his life—his case was 
denied in August, 2012. It was acknowledged in the court report that, in other countries such as 
Switzerland, the right to die has been legalized. However, while the UK has advanced some laws 
regarding end-of-life decisions—for instance, the Suicide Act of 1961 [11] decriminalized individuals 
who attempted to commit suicide—the UK does not recognize voluntary active euthanasia as lawful. 
Thus, Nicklinson, whom the court recognized could not end his own life (other than through  
self-starvation), required the assistance of another, which is an act that is not currently immune from 
criminal conviction in the UK at present date ([1], paragraph 15). Although a number of advocates for 
Nicklinson’s position have advanced forms of appeal, including Lord Joffe who has presented 
Parliament with several amended bills regarding the right to die, UK law appears to be “bound” to the 
belief that voluntary euthanasia—in this case appearing to be conflated with the term “mercy killing” 
to encompass the notion of a “consented death”—should in no way be decriminalized. Instead, law 
stipulates that the actor who ends a life is inevitably a “murderer,” regardless of whether the act was 
committed in full accord: “It has been established for centuries”, stated the court, “that consent to the 
deliberate infliction of death is no defence to a charge of murder” ([1], paragraph 57, s. 7).  
In Nicklinson’s case, such deferral to existing precedent is interesting in the context of life and 
death decisions because precedent responds to mercy “killing” and voluntary euthanasia in the context 
of murder as if this were “inevitable.” Reflecting upon this “inevitability” through Derrida’s insight 
into sovereignty politics is most illuminating. According to Derrida, “Political sovereignty presupposes 
the determination of an enemy.” Moreover, it “needs an enemy to be what it is,” and is “not limited 
to...state structure” ([6], p. 77). This friend/enemy relation is arguably constructed through law in the 
case of the right to die, as evinced in Nicklinson’s case. It comes to the fore in the legal proceedings, 
whereby the appeal document clearly outlines a link between mercy killing and the notion of a 
bellicose relationship with the other. This bellicose relation is defined through the historical legal 
example of the duel: 
this proposition is established beyond doubt by the law on dueling, where even if the deceased was the 
challenger, his consent to the risk of being deliberately killed by his opponent does not alter the case ([1], 
paragraph 57, s. 7). 
The duel, deemed analogous to mercy killing in Nicklinson’s court judgment, might prompt some sort 
of response here. It is deemed analogous because it deals with a scenario whereby a person consents to 
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his or her own death, yet the person who commits the consented act is not exonerated. In drawing on 
the duel by way of example, one cultivates an image of two subjects embedded in a “theatrical 
presentation” of power, or a war-like “event” ([10], p. 92). Such a presentation of events is akin to the 
process that Derrida suggests is the rationalization of sovereign authority. Perpetuating the belief that 
“man is wolf to man,” and therefore that we should fear death at the hands of the other, is how 
sovereignty asserts its authority as the necessary protector and guarantor of life. It is no wonder, in 
cases where an individual challenges this fundamental relation between fear and sovereignty, that the 
moment of deconstruction is deferred to humanity’s “inherent” beast-like quality: sovereignty must 
perpetuate the belief that we fear death, notably at the hands of the other, from whom the sovereign 
protects us. In the case of the right to die, this appears to occur by framing compassionate death in the 
context of a criminal act whereby the other is always, inevitably, a “murderer.” 
Deferring to such bellicose examples as dueling arguably reasserts a binary between friend and foe 
through the perpetuation of fear. Even under a sovereign order that advances the values of liberal 
individualism—that is, freedom to self-determination, and therefore an individual “sovereignty over 
oneself” of sorts—state sovereignty, as the “absolute” protector of such freedom, must cultivate the 
notion that one’s neighbor is to be feared through recourse to the ‘essence’ of human nature as wolf-like.  
recognizing a partial excuse of acting out of compassion would be dangerous. Just as a defence of necessity 
‘can very simply become a mask for anarchy’, so the concept of ‘compassion’—vague in itself—could very 
easily become a cover for selfish or ignoble reasons for killing, not least because people often act out of 
mixed motives ([1], paragraph 54, s 7.7). 
Thus, the court is clear to remind us that it would be dangerous or “anarchic” to fully believe that 
people will always act out of compassion. It reminds us that, while we may have left behind a “state of 
nature,” our civil “neighbors” are not to be trusted; we should only trust the sovereign who has our 
best interests at heart. The interests of the other cannot be “known”; they are always particularized 
against the universal “good” interests of the benevolent sovereign. The compassionate care for 
another’s life arguably serves to enunciate a political practice of sovereignty that defers to legal 
precedent grounded in an essential notion of humanity’s essence as “wolf-like.” Without this recourse 
to man’s nature as corrupt or bad and something to be feared, we might question the very role of law 
and legal sanctions. The friend/foe distinction therefore effectuates and sustains sovereignty, and it 
does so through constructing compassionate cases as sinister. In Nicklinson’s case, the Commission 
interestingly posits the “problem” of mercy killing as it relates to compassion: 
Under the current law, the compassionate motives of the ‘mercy’ killer are in themselves never capable of 
providing a basis for a partial excuse. Some would say that this is unfortunate. On this view, the law affords 
more recognition to other less, or at least no more, understandable emotions such as anger (provocation), and 
fear (self-defence) ([1], paragraph 54, s 7.7).  
This passage highlights two important, interrelated points. First, it identifies that “compassion,” framed 
as a more positive virtue, is not recognized in law. Second, it contrasts this compassionate motive to 
less virtuous reasons for ending a life that are framed in terms of fear and anger. Thus, the Commission 
recognizes how “lesser emotions” or negative precepts like anger and fear can be considered 
acceptable motives for the taking of a life that lessen a conviction from murder to “manslaughter.” For 
instance, if one acts out of a fear for one’s life, this can be considered self-defense and therefore not 
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murder of the first degree ([1], paragraph 54, s. 7.7). Likewise, if one argues that one was “provoked” 
into action that led to another’s death, one can also acquire a reduced sentence. However, in UK cases 
of mercy killing whereby a subject acts out of “compassion,” subjects are not exonerated or granted a 
status of “manslaughter” and instead are afforded the status of “murderer.”  
Derrida’s insight into sovereignty might help us explain this acceptance of other motives more 
readily than the motive of compassion. Discernably, the first and second acts (anger and fear) do not 
contradict a sovereign logic. This is so because, arguably, they work alongside the “wolf-like” traits 
that sovereignty posits as essential to humanity. Thus, while individuals may have challenged 
sovereignty in the sense that they took matters of “self-protection” into “their own hands” as opposed 
to allowing the sovereign to protect them ([6], p. 40), this does not contradict a logic which purports 
that the other cannot be trusted. These cases instead replicate the sovereign logic because they justify 
its very existence; they justify the assumption that we fear death, and that the other can cause such 
death. The case of anger or provocation does not contradict but, rather, reinforces the “nature” of 
humanity as bellicose and war-like, which acts rashly and therefore requires a sovereign to maintain 
order and protection. In these examples, law and sovereignty “protects” the vulnerable—the performer 
of the act. The person acting from fear is vulnerable for their life; the person acting from provocation 
is vulnerable to their “nature,” both of which the sovereign can “forgive.” In the case of Nicklinson, 
however, the “other,” the “doer” of the act of death—the mercy killer or the physician—is not 
“vulnerable.” Instead, they are framed as the “murderer,” and Nicklinson, in turn, is framed as the 
“vulnerable,” despite his claim otherwise as a self-determined liberal sovereign subject. Law strips him 
of his ability to decide: he is made vulnerable, and therefore is not “the strongest.”  
4. Reason of the Strongest 
The ultimate decision over life and death can be related to Derrida’s discussion of the founding and 
sustaining violence of sovereignty and law that he refers to as “reason of the strongest” ([6], p. 34). 
This means that sovereignty cannot exist without force. Quoting La Fontaine, Derrida notes in The 
Beast and the Sovereign that “The reason of the strongest is always the best” ([6], p. 34). Likewise, in 
Rogues he posits that “no sovereignty without force, without the force of the strongest, whose 
reason—the reason of the strongest—is to win out over everything” ([12], p. 101). The deferral of the 
Commission in Nicklinson’s case to “murder” is, arguably, made possible through the fact that the 
desire to die touches on, and potentially unravels, a binary with life and death. This binary sustains the 
sovereign’s authority as that which is a necessary protector from death; the sovereign is the strongest, 
after all. This strength and authority must, therefore, be sustained, even if someone like Nicklinson 
desires death and does not want this “protection.” Such “protection,” then, operates as a means to 
sustain sovereignty as indivisible and also maintain an essential link between sovereignty and 
obedience through recourse to the sovereign protection from acts of murder—or “threats” to one’s life, 
as well as the value of life and need for sovereign order. 
If state sovereignty appears as the example of absolute sovereignty in the Beast and the Sovereign 
Volume One, it is possibly because this has historically been treated as if it is that which is granted—
or, better, grants itself—the original right to preserve life, but also to take life (see, for example, [13], 
p. 138). Here, we might recall Derrida’s criticism of Agamben’s [14] enunciation of sovereignty ([6], 
pp. 315–334). Derrida considers problematic Agamben’s all-powerful sovereign, who allegedly has the 
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capacity to turn into a thanatopolitical machine. As Derrida writes, Agamben draws on Aristotle’s 
distinction between zoe, a life common to all living beings, and bios, a life common to political 
community, that he argues come to merge under sovereign governance. Rather than sovereignty saving 
us from a state of nature, as Hobbes declared, Agamben claims that sovereign governance renders all 
life zoe, or “bare.” He argues that this exposes us to an unconditional capacity to be killed. In seeking 
to “overcome” this problematic, Agamben is left with only a complete anarchic overturning of 
sovereignty in toto. Derrida deconstructs this biopolitical sovereignty toward the end of the first 
volume of The Beast and the Sovereign and speaks to this sovereign ability to enact violence in the 
name of the protection from fear that in turn perpetuates such fear and violence. If Derrida is reluctant 
to accept Agamben’s suggestion of a complete renouncement of sovereignty, it is because the latter 
posits sovereignty as inevitably “absolute.”  
While Derrida deconstructs the grounds that sustain the belief in the necessity of absolute 
sovereignty, he does not deny that sovereignty appears real. Thus, he does not deny that sovereignty 
posits itself as indivisible, through the deferral to force. In Rogues, Derrida speaks of this 
“autopositioning of ipseity itself” as the “source of every ‘reason of the strongest’ as the right [droit] 
granted to force or the force granted to law” ([12], p. 12). Thus, state sovereignty instates and 
maintains its sovereign authority through a deferral to force, or the force of law. The force of the 
sovereign or legal decision becomes the event of reason. Reason and force unite in this “reason of the 
strongest.” In most cases, this occurs silently, meaning that sovereignty can act as it wills, without 
challenge. Arguably, it does so in right to die cases through two key deferrals. First, it defers to a 
notion of sovereignty as representative of a unified “will” of the people, which in turn allows for it to 
claim that it is “democratic” and therefore universally “good.” Concomitantly, it does so through an 
appeal to “life”—or the sanctity of life—as the ultimate normative good that rationalizes the 
aforementioned unified will. As Derrida expresses, “it is silence, the silent order that commands and 
leads the world” ([12], p. 4); sovereignty is “silent and unavowable” ([12], p. 100).  
In the first example, sovereignty claims that it is founded on the universal will of the people, which 
operates as a unified body, the “Leviathan.” Such “unification” is a means of legitimating the founding 
violence of sovereignty. As Foucault wrote: “It’s what you wanted, it is you the subjects who 
constituted the sovereign that represents you” ([10], p. 98). This “universally” willed sovereignty, is, 
however—as explored throughout this essay—a ruse. There is a paradoxical feature to democracy 
whereby “sovereignty is incompatible with universality even though it is called for by every concept of 
international, and thus universal or universalizable, democratic, law” ([12], p. 101). This becomes 
apparent in Nicklinson’s case where changes within English common law are regarded as acceptable if 
applying legal precedent, but unacceptable in cases like Nicklinson’s where revisions around murder 
would have to be changed through parliamentary law—or parliamentary sovereignty—itself. 
Accordingly, Parliament is deemed “democratic” in such a way that it considers itself to be universally 
representative of “the interest of the state.” For instance, in response to the question of “exception”—
hence, why law cannot treat examples case by case—the Commission drew on the division between 
common law and parliamentary law. The former, common law, is considered that of custom, whereas 
the latter, parliamentary law, is a matter of decision from a “democratic” body:  
As to constitutionality, it is one thing for the courts to adapt and develop the principles of the common law 
incrementally in order to keep up with the requirements of justice in a changing society, but major changes 
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involving matters of controversial social policy are for Parliament. There is ample authority for that 
proposition. Lord Reid said in Shaw V DPP [1962] AC 220, 275: ‘Where Parliament fears to tread it is not 
for the courts to rush in’ ([1], paragraph 79). 
The deferral in the above cited example is to Parliament as the authority which determines decisions 
regarding the criminalization of acts of murder through the application of “fundamental principles,” 
rather than “changing economic conditions and habits of thought” that occurs through common law ([1], 
paragraph 80). This deferral to Parliament is implicated in a logic of law that attempts to appeal to both 
the particular and the universal. Common law operates through legal decisions set as precedent by 
judges. In this regard, it is considered local or “particular” to some degree. However, this common law 
can only fundamentally be amended on the basis of a universal appeal or reach—hence the “finality” 
of the decision. This deferral to Parliament as that which has the power to determine end of life 
decisions potentially serves to frame a version of sovereignty as an arbitrator of justice. The sovereign 
is presented as a “democratically willed” enunciation, and one whose decisions are  
universally applicable.  
Another deferral, which supports the “reason of the strongest” as that which has absolute universal 
reach, is “the sanctity of life” and the state interest in “life” above all other interests. The Commission 
in Nicklinson’s case drew on the words of Lord Mustil, which read: 
So far as I am aware, no satisfactory reason has ever been advanced for suggesting that it makes the least 
difference in law, as distinct from morals, if the patient consents to or indeed urges the ending of his life by 
active means. The reason must be that, as in the other cases of consent to being killed, the interest of the state 
in preserving life overrides the otherwise all-powerful interests of patient autonomy ([1], paragraph 57, s. 9) 
Most compelling in this statement is the emphasis on the “interests of the state” over and above 
Nicklinson, who, as expressed earlier, appears to be “particularized” as an individual. His particular 
interests are incompatible with the state’s preservation of life, whereby the latter is deemed above all 
to be a higher moral good.  
The Commission also drew on other examples that contrasted with Nicklinson’s case to explore if 
and when ending a life would be considered legally acceptable. These other examples arguably 
presented moments of deferral that allowed the Commission to formulate reasons to deny Nicklinson’s 
appeal. Interestingly, such examples deferred to a normative investment in sustaining life, as expressed 
in the sanctity of life argument above. For instance, as posited earlier, one such example given was that 
of self-defense. In this instance, the act of self-defense is said to operate according to a desire to live, 
which does not conflict with the role of sovereignty as a guarantor of life’s preservation. The only 
transgression here is that one has taken matters into one’s own hands, and removed the role of the 
sovereign. In most cases, this type of act would not be acceptable, because the sovereign contract 
means that one transfers such role of “protector” to sovereignty. However, as Derrida recognizes and 
as indicated earlier, this type of self-protection might still occur in cases where such sovereign 
authority could not possibly offer immediate protection ([6], p. 40). Thus, the transgression does not 
challenge or undo the sovereign’s authority, or its functional role.  
In addition to the matter of self-defense, the Commission also drew on the case of Re A (Children) 
(Conjoined Twins Surgical Separation) [2001] to offer another example of “death” that is deemed 
acceptable when granted “in favor of life” ([1], paragraph 70). In this case, twins, Jodie and Mary, 
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were born conjoined. Mary was reliant on an artery that connected her to Jodie; however, she would 
not survive as a singleton. If doctors did not separate the twins, neither would survive, but if they did 
separate them, Mary’s life would inevitably be lost. It was ruled that the twins could be separated and, 
ultimately, that Mary’s life could be let go for the sake of saving Jodie. One plea made in this case was 
that the doctors were “coming to Jodies’s defence and removing her from the threat of fatal harm to 
her presented by Mary’s draining her life blood” ([1], paragraph 70). The case heard that it was better, 
therefore, to save one life, than to have both lives lost. In this sense, the case erred on the side of life, 
rather than death, and allowed the twins to be separated. What is more, even in this case where a 
“bellicose” relation may not readily be inferred, the court was able to articulate the relation between 
Jodie and Mary in the context of a curious friend/enemy distinction whereby Jodie suffered by virtue 
of the “threat of the other”—a fear of her twin “draining her.”  
From this discussion, there appears to be a foundational fear at stake here in the demarcation of self 
from other, and the necessary role of law in safeguarding us from one another. This is reflected 
through legal decisions that ensure the universality of law and its necessary protection of life. In sum, 
the concern is that opening up law to the possibility of death by another also dissolves the originary 
relation between sovereignty and protection, and protection and obedience. The reason of the 
strongest, then, is alleged to protect us, even in its violent, prosthetic state.  
5. Solitude and Self-Protection 
As expressed above, absolute accounts of sovereignty performed through reason of the strongest 
present us with an interpretation of sovereignty that secures us from threat of death at the hands of the 
other. Moreover, these cases seem to illustrate the problem of a sovereign logic that supposes, as we 
were reminded earlier via Schmitt, that the friend/enemy distinction permeates to the level of the 
liberal individual, whose right to self-determination and freedom is only granted so long as this said 
individual does not transgress the social contract and infringe upon another’s liberty. On this account, 
we might therefore say that we are obedient to a sovereign order because it protects us, or 
“immunizes” us, from the threat we are immanently exposed to in the state of nature; hence, death at 
the hands of the other. Moreover, it continues to immunize us from this threat even under a sovereign 
arrangement of power, whereby the other must still be kept at arm’s length through liberal concepts 
that “individualize us.” Even in the case of the newborn twins, which might typically be considered a 
picture of “innocence,” we see the language of the wolf framed as the desire for individual immunity: 
we are left with the sad image of the “parasitic” baby, Mary, articulated as a “threat” to her sister, 
Jodie, whom she was “draining of blood.” 
Esposito [7,8] explores the notion of individualization and immunization under liberal sovereignty. 
He argues that liberalism grants us freedom under sovereignty, but describes this as a very limited 
view of freedom because it grants us a “freedom from” the other. In his words, we are free from 
“communal obligation.” This communal obligation is akin to what we experience in a state of nature 
when we do not have any legal borders around us to protect us from one another. Sovereignty grants us 
this protection, yet in doing so it both brings us together as a totality in the form of the “people,” and 
simultaneously divides us as individual “persons.” As a result, we are each individually “immunized” 
as “liberal” sovereign subjects and protected from this “community” of “others.” As Esposito recalls, 
“that which everyone fears in the munus...is the violent loss of borders, which awarding identity to 
Societies 2013, 3 75 
 
 
him, ensures his subsistence” ([15], p. 8). Arguably, this is a similar point articulated by Hannah 
Arendt (1968) some years earlier. In our desire to be free, she argues that we lose our capacity to be 
free. Through resorting to the “I-Will” as she termed it, or through one’s desire to withdraw from 
community into oneself, as Esposito imagines, we are free from others, but not free  
“with” ([16], pp. 160–161).  
Accordingly, civil society under the sovereignty Derrida describes is equated with freedom 
understood in a liberal sense in which we are free to have property that separates us from one another, 
that permeates to the level of the body: we are proprietors of ourselves and our bodies which draws a 
physical boundary between us and others, whereby we are “free” to live with minimal interference. 
This has two key effects. First, it presents a problem when we need to permeate this immunity 
paradigm. Thus, where immunity is a feature of state sovereignty, the state makes us believe that it is 
freeing us from fear by dividing us from others who are “wolves to us.” The friend/enemy distinction 
inherent in the state of nature whereby everyone was one’s foe is not eradicated, but is replicated under 
sovereignty. Arguably, this comes to the fore in right to die cases because this logic of sovereignty that 
replicates bellicose relations means that law must operate in a way that alleges to protect us from the 
other, even when we require their help to end our lives compassionately. Second, although sovereignty 
in its liberal variation appears to grant us the right to sovereign self-determination, this right is 
dissolved when it comes up against the sovereignty of the state. Such is apparent in cases where an 
individual challenges the law that prevents him or her from acting in the name of his or her own 
sovereignty. In Nicklinson’s case, this came to the fore when his individual sovereign desire to die was 
renounced. Law and state sovereignty respects individual liberal sovereignty—hence the right to  
self-protection and thereby, to some degree, the right to self-determination, or autos—only if this 
autonomy does not challenge the fundamental operation of sovereignty itself. Where right-to-die cases 
present a threat to sovereignty, potentially revealing its deconstructability, sovereignty must perpetuate 
itself as absolute: 
‘There is not SOVEREIGNTY or THE sovereign’, declares Derrida; ‘There is not THE beast and THE 
sovereign. There are different and sometimes antagonistic forms of sovereignty, and it is always in the name 
of one that one attacks the other ([6], p. 76). 
In attacking the liberal sovereign subject who threatens its absolute appearance, not only does 
sovereignty divide us from others, but also, arguably, it divides us from ourselves. If sovereignty is 
equated with “ipseity” or “self sameness”—hence the idea of being “autonomous”—it must ensure that 
its own authority, or ipseity is not threatened. Through a performance of indivisibility, state 
sovereignty is able to take on the role of the Agambian sovereign, as s/he who has the ability to reduce 
the individual to a divisible state, dissolving his/her sovereignty or ipseity. Returning to Agamben, in 
this case, it appears we witness an example of the liberal individual sovereign’s divisibility in the form 
of a reversal of zoe and bios. Through silent domination, state sovereignty re-divides the individual 
such as Nicklinson into bios and zoe: the body of the subject is politicized (made bios) in as much as it 
is kept alive against its wishes, reifying the absolute truth and structure of the sovereign order. And, in 
this politicization of the body and the refusal to allow the individual to die by the hands of an other 
without immunity, the desiring “will” of the subject is discarded as “bare life” or zoe, in Agamben’s 
terms, in the sense that the individual’s sovereignty over its life and death—its self-determination—is 
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renounced by the dominant sovereign. Turning to Esposito’s (2012) account of personhood, whereby 
the “person” is only thus if he “masters his animal part” ([17], p. 22), we see how, in the right-to-die 
cases, the individual who challenges the state sovereign ipseity is necessarily divided and stripped of 
his or her sovereignty and self-determination. Individuals appealing for the right to die present an 
interesting point of tension because they are caught in what Esposito calls a “conceptual tangle” of 
sovereignty whereby they renounce the very thing that also gives them the right to self-determination. 
Personhood, after all, only exists as a dispositif on the basis that there is a state sovereign, and state 
sovereignty, vice versa, only exists because it was “universally willed” by a collective group that could 
become “persons” under its authority ([17], pp. 86–87). In the name of a universal subject (the people) 
who rationally will the sovereign protection in order to “keep the wolves at bay,” the individual who 
desires death at the hands of another is stripped of their personhood, made “subject” only with recourse 
to their animalistic nature—as a vulnerable “body,” a “precarious life” [18]. As Derrida notes, “The 
concept of sovereignty will always imply the possibility of this positionality, this thesis, this self-thesis, 
this autoposition of him who posits or posits himself as ipse, the (self)-same, oneself” ([6], p. 67). The 
fabulous nature of this self-sameness, this ipseity, of the liberal “sovereign” subject, in this case is 
exposed. The subject is no longer self-same, indivisible, but divided through this reference to the 
dispositif of man as soul and animal. If one cannot “reason” sovereignly—hence, if one cannot 
“choose” the right to life, which is universally willed—one is “reduced” to the status of animal, 
because one’s “sovereignty” can no longer be self-same. While a push for individual self-
determination is by no means an adequate resolution for this problematic, since after all it replaces one 
kind of sovereignty or mastery with another, the right-to-die cases do point to a paradoxical logic of 
sovereignty and present a different kind of deconstructive moment. Appealing to the right to die is 
therefore not necessarily a potential deconstructive gesture because of its appeal to self-determination, 
but because of how it potentially allows us to move toward a certain being-with the other, or excessive 
understanding of sovereignty.  
6. Conclusion: Excessive Sovereigns 
If sovereignty is found to be groundless, it is also excessive according to Derrida. This discussion of 
the performance of sovereign indivisibility illustrates the necessary relation between sovereignty and 
unconditionality. In presenting the case of Nicklinson and the right to die, this essay has explored how 
sovereignty appeals to several universalizing qualities to sustain itself. It necessarily posits a universal 
essence of man as wolf to man, whereby it can then legitimate its allegedly “benevolent” role as a 
guarantor of life. This serves, as I have argued, to continue to divide us from one another, which 
ensures we are not a threat to the state sovereign. In addition, sovereignty appeals to other universals 
such as the sanctity of life and the necessary universalization of law that is “democratic.” These are 
“necessary” deferrals because they permit a silent decision, and therefore preclude the need for a 
“decision” that is overtly “forceful.” Such deferrals allow sovereignty’s violent—indeed “rogue”—
foundations to slip by. Furthermore, when an individual continues to challenge sovereignty, he or she 
can further be sanctioned through another, “internal” division, that deconstructs the sovereignty of a 
liberal individual to prevent a threat to a state sovereign order. This goes some way to explain why 
right-to-die cases have failed on appeal in UK law to date.  
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All is not lost, however. As Derrida posits, sovereignty is entirely deconstructable, and, as this 
paper has explored, right-to-die cases provide some insight into the shaky foundations that sustain 
sovereign performances of indivisibility. Arguably, when sovereignty must appeal to something 
beyond itself, which it inevitably must—as indicated by those universals expressed above—it must 
also “exceed” itself. This excess may be violent and destructive, yet can also create openings. 
Therefore, this excess might be thought as “autoimmune” [19]. Autoimmunity might be read as the 
idea that sovereignty contains within it the conditions of its own potential and also its own demise. 
Thus, sovereignty might sometimes make violent decisions that foreclose possibilities, but there 
always exists the possibility that an opening will come, even through this very closure. Two examples 
seem to be operationalized in the case of the individual who desires death. First, the construction of the 
individual as a liberal sovereign subject contains this autoimmune feature. Liberal categories such as 
personhood, property, and rights over one’s body allow the subject to be protected by law (which is 
not universally a “bad” thing because, not only can immunization in many instances be useful, but 
quite often legal protection is desirable). However, in granting this self-protection, liberal 
individualism can also be the condition of its own demise. In the case where an individual needs 
another to help him or her die, the immunizing feature of sovereignty works against itself, attacking 
itself and preventing the individual from exhibiting their own self-protection, where “protection” 
might be better understood as an ending of suffering and of life. Second, on a broader scale, the 
autoimmune condition of sovereignty might be considered parallel to Derrida’s hyperbolic ethics of 
democracy, hospitality, and gift-giving thought both conditionally and unconditionally. Liberty, like 
other unconditionals such as hospitality and gift-giving, is an “absolute” that conditions and thereby 
makes possible the contextual materialization of instances that appear as liberty. This materialization is 
only a performance as such, since liberty is always reaching beyond itself toward the unconditional, or 
the impossible possibility that makes such surfacing possible. Liberty, therefore, should not be thought 
only as a universal category that protects us from the other and renders us under a sovereign order to 
be free from the other but, rather, we might suppose a hyperbolic ethic to imagine liberty in excess of 
this self-sameness, to imagine it otherwise and more openly—more responsibly. In this case, rather 
than seeing the unit of the liberal individual as immunized from the other, we might think of how we 
can open up this “subject” to exceed “self-sameness.”  
In short, autoimmunity can be violent and destructive, as much as it can also create openness, 
indeterminacy, and ways of being that exceed the autos or the self-sameness—the absolute sovereign. 
Derrida presents autoimmunity as a movement or iteration that might be better thought as a broad 
instance of historical patterns of shifting ways of becoming. For example, autoimmunity in this regard 
is understood as iterations of change, as modes of closure and openness. Like the potential creativity in 
destruction, autoimmunity presents opportunities for openness in such violent attempts at closure (e.g., 
closure of the “immunized individual” or closure in terms of the “sovereign decision”). As indicated, 
one measure of openness might be to try and think the right to die through more open means beyond 
this essential link to fear and murder. Could we consider the right to die a compassionate gift, or a gift 
of death? 
As I close this paper, I want to also create an opening of sorts by gesturing to where Derrida takes 
us in the second volume of The Beast and the Sovereign. In the eighth session, Derrida speaks of 
Heidegger’s understanding of transcendence being “a correlate of the power of the as such.” Moreover, 
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transcendence, Derrida writes, is “shared in Mitsein, in the common opening to beings” ([20], p. 227). 
In these reflections on Heidegger, Derrida, it seems, identifies something worth retaining. This value 
appears to lie in the possibility of the relation between transcendence and the as such, between the 
unconditional being-with, and the being-in-solitude, or conditional sovereignty. In our musings over 
liberty, the impossible possibility of sovereignty, and the capacity to exceed and to be more open, 
could we imagine a variation of the Heidegerrian Mitsein-to-come? A Derridean openness to 
otherness? As Derrida writes, 
sovereignty does not exist; it is always in the process of positing itself by refuting itself, by denying or 
disavowing itself; it is always in the process of autoimmunising itself, of betraying itself by betraying the 
democracy that nonetheless can never do without it ([12], p. 101). 
This democracy to come, the possibility of being-with, might help us think autoimmunity as the 
changing patterns of sovereignty, and the in-flux ways of always striving for openings within the 
closures sovereignty necessarily demands. Such an opening might be read as an openness to death, an 
openness to the other, and thinking the cases of the right to die as compassionate moments of giving. 
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